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He concludes his essay with an example of how the social scientists in Human Practices are dominated by the natural scientists.
7 This is ironic because his account becomes a form of human practice itself as it leads him to reflect on the wider implications of the unequal power relations between the social and natural scientists. This reflection turns on a type of affect that bears directly on many of the interests protected by law: thumds. Translated roughly as "indignation," it is a Hellenistic concept that refers to self-protective reactions in response to attacks on one's self-regard. 8 In the common image of the day, logos (knowledge) was the charioteer reining in and directing eros (physical arousal toward others) and thumds (moral regard for oneself).
Rabinow feels thumds because he suspects that some scientists on the Syn-BERC project are treated differently from others. 9 He wonders:
I pose the question of what affect is appropriate in such a situation [of being dominated]? Surely anger, or more accurately the Greek thum6s is a plausible candidate. Why so? Thumds is the capacity of the soul to manifest anger and zeal. Thums is closely connected to the value one sets on oneself as well as the manner in which others respond to that self-esteem. These conditions lead directly to considerations of justice, politics, and ethics. examine the 2oo9 AALS meeting theme of institutional pluralism. Stripped of context, it is an innocent-sounding phrase. Returned to its social context, though, it forms part of a history of how the religiously affiliated law schools came to be constituted as a special interest group as backlash to the efforts of the ABA and the AALS to protect sexual minority students, staff, and faculty from discrimination in the legal academy. Reading in context, through rather than in spite of this social history, leads to a disturbing question about the liberal register: is it too mealy to stand up to certain social wrongs, in this case discrimination against gays, lesbians, and other sexual minorities? That is what I mean about "calling the question." I conclude by suggesting that schism is a better model for this question than is institutional pluralism.
THE ENABLING RHETORIC OF POSTMODERN REACTIONARIES
The AALS 2009 meeting theme must be seen as part of the conservative and reactionary ideology that has insinuated itself into the political and academic imagination using liberal forms as cover. Sidney Blumenthal tells the beginning of the story in his account of the early Republican mobilization, This war includes David Horowitz's Academic Bill of Rights, the American Council of Trustees and Alumnae, and the movement for "conservative" diversity promoted by these forces as an antidote to rampant liberalism on U.S.
campuses. It is the humanities and social science departments at universities that have borne the brunt of reactionary and conservative backlash, but its influence has been felt in the legal academy too. Here its most visible examples include the Christian Legal Society's litigation campaign against the nondiscrimination policies (especially of public law schools) and the spectacular successes of the Federalist Society, with chapters in law schools and national placement networks that have seeded the federal judiciary.
In this most current chapter of the new Right's efforts, it has learned to project the social anxiety of religious conservatives and social reactionaries when faced with the substantive openness of the university by displacing and restating that anxiety in the familiar liberal and progressive terms of "discrimination." Stanley Fish said as much in a i995 editorial in the New York Times: "Liberals and progressives have been slow to realize that their preferred vocabulary has been hijacked and that when they respond to oncehallowed phrases [and words like 'discrimination'] they are responding to a ghost now animated by a new machine."'" This is so because backlash needed a conceptual interface with the liberal institutions that were its natural targets. In effect, the Right has gone postmodern by deconstructing offending liberal categories such that they no longer have any political valence or rhetorical impact.
3 Much as gay activists reappropriated "queer" and "fag" into badges of identity, the Right has digested the epithets most offensive to it, words like "diversity," "difference," and "pluralism. 
ORWELL AT THE AALS
Like all good high ideology, the statement uses ennobling language to articulate its conception of legal education and the AALS's role. The AALS is
Institutional
Pluralism from the Standpoint of Its Victims made up of "self-governing intellectual communities"; the goal is a "healthy intellectual life" that supports students; the good values here are "institutional variety" and "distinctive identities"; and the wicked values are "uniformity" and "conformity." The reader must move from text to context-defeating the Right's reading instructions-to appreciate the rhetorical work done by the concept. First, institutional pluralism's bedfellows make an odd (polygamous?) quartet. As an umbrella concept, institutional pluralism is said to bring together four major types of law schools: state schools, religiously affiliated law schools, historically black schools, and schools with methodological commitments. It is troubling to suggest that a single institution may not be institutionally pluralist enough within its walls such that difference counts only when it is inflected at the level of institutional form; but appreciating how the statement on institutional pluralism works as an occlusive, strategic tool of ideology involves more than this.
Second, the overall goal of the statement is to undermine the legitimacy of the AALS by situating it in a field of forces and institutions that-in the aggregate--diminish the stature of the AALS as legal education's chief regulator. (This is a classic right-wing move.) Of course, market dynamics are one check on the function and value of the AALS. Running through the statement is a neoliberal assumption that celebrates a market framing for legal education.
Institutional pluralism is likened to the virtues of consumer choice, a poignant comparison for formerly publicly supported universities that realize that they are now only "publicly assisted" or for educators who refuse to see students as clients. Even in this framing, though, the market is not all good as it is part of a combination of forces-"powerful market and regulatory norms"-that run the risk of undermining the localized freedom to create. Ironically enough for a statement issued by the AALS, the unwelcome regulator that is holding back all of this institutional richness is, of course, the AALS itself and, more specifically, its accreditation standards (about which I say more later). The statement also seems to reject-or at least to question-the value of ordinal fixations caused by the U.S. News and World Report system. That would seem to be a good thing, of interest to the vast majority of law schools that find themselves holding up the bottom of the pyramid.
I see several valid objections to this reading of institutional pluralism. First, not all religious schools promote discrimination. Indeed, many of them go out of their way to be inclusive of sexual minorities. Second, the question of whether to give effect to religiously based rejection of sexual minorities is only one of the points of divergence between some of the religiously affiliated schools and the secularizing expectations of accrediting agencies. Granted, rising tolerance for sexual minorities is only one form of secular provocation for some religiously affiliated schools, but it is an important one that is likely to intensify with time. Taken as a whole, though, the statement on institutional pluralism works a highly stylized interest convergence, combining enough surface elements of liberalism with latent reactionary elements to be acceptable to a still liberal institution like the AALS that-when push comes to shove-will look no deeper than the surface forms. To do otherwise would be to use methods more critical than typically associated with the AALS. Though appealing on the surface, this move needs to be seen as part of an overall attack on the presumptuousness of a secularizing national authority like the AALS to dictate governance norms that may conflict with those at religiously affiliated schools.
For those who do like deep or critical analysis, though, what is really going on here is that the religiously affiliated schools and their natural (rather than pluralist) allies have found a new shell. Consider the extent to which the three signature panels emphasized the interests of the religiously affiliated law schools.' " All three of the panels had explored related facets of the religiously affiliated law schools or their fellow travelers: one of the three presidential sessions was devoted entirely to the interests of the religiously affiliated law schools; the panel on institutional pluralism discussed religion at length; and the panel on associational pluralism involved separate organizations that are complementary to the religiously affiliated law schools.
GODLY SCHOOLS AND THE GAYS: RENOUNCING THE OTHER (AND VICE VERSA)
If the religiously affiliated schools are using institutional pluralism as a shield to promote sectarian ends, it should come as no surprise since they have been in cahoots to resist the profession's antidiscrimination norms for nearly t wo decades, beginning when the American Bar Association (ABA) and the AALS decided to extend these norms to include gays and lesbians in the legal academy. Of course, most people are heterosexuals but many of them make the unjustified leap of reaching moral and normative conclusions from their object choice preferences.
This history starts in 199o, when the AALS House of Representatives voted unanimously to amend its Bylaw 6-4 to add "sexual orientation" to the list of protected categories under the Association's nondiscrimination provisions. 8 Many religiously affiliated schools objected and, to appease them, the AALS Executive Committee adopted an Interpretive Principle in August 1993 letting these schools take into account a prospective faculty member's religious orientation in promotion and tenure. 
SCHISM AS REDEMPTION
Returning to Rabinow-what is needed is a better framework for animating sexual minority thumds. No mere dyspepsia, thumds is a practice of self-cultivation to deal with a threatening world by giving an account of it that rehabilitates one's sense of injured dignity. This project should not be confused with neurosis, which situates the problem inside the person rather than in an illegitimate social condition. Neurosis also privatizes the harm by framing relief in individual terms. 29 In contrast, the direction in thumds starts with the legitimacy of the injury and moves outward against the injuring world. The goal is to revive the expectation by directing one's hostility outward against the aggressor. This can provide a public framework for remediating collective harms. So thumds is more socially constructive than the superficially related idea of ressentiment.° Indeed, thum6s is one of the few ways keep one's wits while in a dominated present. This became clear to many after Proposi- So institutional pluralism may mask differences that are so constitutive that they should be framed more overtly (and honestly) as schism. Schism lets institutions take sides in a social controversy and bear costs from doing so, that way helping-or hindering-social justice. Schism avoids the smarminess that Stanley Fish criticizes when he writes that "neutrality" is often a front for immoral behavior:
Those who stand on neutral principles often wish to be neutral in the political sense, and they avoid taking sides in deference to the pluralism of the forces in the field. It is for them that Machiavelli reserves his greatest scorn: "As a general thing, anyone who is not your friend will advise neutrality, while anyone who is your friend will ask you to join him, weapon in hand." Taking sides, weapon in hand, is not a sign of zealotry or base partisanship; it is the sign of morality; and it is the morality of taking sides."
Calling the question on normative heterosexuality invites persons and institutions to take a stand. Because one's reputation is at stake in this position, it is also a wager, one that proponents of normative heterosexuality fear losing. In the short run, draping religiously framed overinvestment in heterosexuality in the language of institutional pluralism gives these views cover in a social world that, increasingly, sees such views as it sees blacksmiths, an artifact that had a function only in a past long overtaken by technological and social developments. 33 Eventually, a new consensus will emerge (history may absolve us, but who wants to wait?) that relates back to the morality of this moment and that will lead to proper adjustments to reputation. In the meantime, maintaining one's own moral clarity in the present-regardless of the lags in other persons and institutions-is a way to manage one's own force impact, channeling it as much as one can by conforming one's speech, conduct, and being to one's own sense of moral certainty, although it may be contested in social space. We would no longer entertain arguments about institutional pluralism when it came to whether racial discrimination is legitimate because a normative determination is already in place that such arguments are unacceptable. We have reached no such normative determination when it comes to anti-gay discrimination, so we can entertain pluralist defenses of normative heterosexuality.
And this is not to say that normative heterosexuality is anywhere near losing effective, ongoing control over social institutions such as courts, schools, and government. Its coup de grace is still far away. What is happening, though, is that, for the first time in such a serious and persistent way, a reasoned challenge is being mounted to the traditional order of normative heterosexuality. Just this trend is alarming enough to those who would have hoped for generations more of unquestioned and, in effect, invisible normative heterosexuality.
So these trends are calling the question. And it leads to another set of questions about professional relations between sexual minorities and others: where does the liberal situate himself in this conflict? How ought the sexual minority academic and her allies think about heterosexual acquiescence with straight supremacy? We lack the kind of moral clarity that develops after a morally contested issue has been resolved. The direct stakeholders of this conflict are sexual minorities and those committed to normative heterosexuality, but the conflict also reveals another conflict of liberalism, in the sense used by Stanley Fish. If liberals cannot see their way to some degree of substantive commitment to equality-in this case for sexual minorities-they should rethink whether they are really liberals.
Association of American Law Schools 2009

Statement on Institutional Pluralism
The AALS is an association of self-governing intellectual communities. Member schools are expected to adhere to our core values of teaching, scholarship, academic freedom, and diversity. But within the wide space bounded by those values our members are very different kinds of institutions. There are 72 state schools that play special roles in the legal communities of their sponsoring states. There are 49 religiously affiliated law schools whose missions are defined or influenced by particular faiths. There are law schools at historically black colleges and universities that have their own special commitments; and schools whose intellectual efforts are governed by a particular point of view (like law and economics) or directed at a particular subject matter (environmental law, or intellectual property). This year's theme focuses on the value of our institutional differences.
Institutional pluralism is a good thing for our students in the same way choices are good for consumers in other fields. It may also contribute in an important way to a healthy intellectual life. Progress in the life of the mind is a cultural achievement. A community of scholars working on the same problem, or in the same idiom, may accomplish things a group of disconnected individuals could not. (Think of the Manhattan Project, or fin de si~cle Vienna.)
The Association should cherish the interests of its members in pursuing these ends.
unlikely to make McConnell pause because all it does is name his strategy. He wants the category of viewpoint discrimination to lose its edge and become so capacious that nothing falls outside it. If he succeeds in making everything viewpoint discrimination, his clients will be successful in their course of action; and to that end he is willing to employ a form of analysis (practiced by poststructuralists and postmodernists) he may personally deplore, the corrosive interrogation of anything and everything." Fish, supra note 12, at 226.
14. The new Right has developed several generative assumptions as the building blocks for its arguments in favor of more religion in public life. See Jos6 Gabilondo, "When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets the New Right Get Away with Murder," 44 Wake ForestL. Rev. iot (2oo9) (analyzing and countering reactionary rhetorical moves in favor of more religion in university life). 15. Fish explains how and why it works: "Well, first of all, by sleight of hand. The eye is deflected away from the whole history, culture, habitats, society-and the parts, now freed from any stabilizing context, can be described in any way one likes. But why is the sleight of hand successful? Why don't more people see through it? Because it is performed with the vocabulary of America's civic religion the vocabulary of equal opportunity, color-blindness, race neutrality, and, above all, individual rights. This was also the vocabulary of civil rights activists, anti-McCarthyites, and liberals in general, many of whom are now puzzled and even defensive when they hear their own words coming out of the mouths of their traditional opponents." Fish, supra note 12, at 312. 
28.
In a passage suggesting that religious power receded after the Enlightenment, Fish notes how gay marriage has helped to reactivate religious factors in society: When John Milton and others debated divorce in the seventeenth century, their proof texts were scriptural even though what was at stake was a change in the civil law. The example shows not only that the prestige and scope of a vocabulary is a function of historical change rather than an indication of a natural epistemological divide but that changes in history can be reversed. Now that gay marriage is a possibility (or a specter) on the public scene, theological considerations are once again being urged in the public sphere and I have recently heard radio talk-show conversations that might well have occurred in the 164os. Fish, supra note 12, at 217. 29. This process should not be confused with sublimation, in which the essential antagonism and injury are buried so as to achieve a smoothness of psychic purpose. Sublimation leads to making one's peace with the irritant. Thumds suggests a permanent structure of oppositional awareness. The two are palpably different. 30. Popularized by Friedrich Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) and elaborated on by his student Max Scheler in Ressentiment (1912), ressentiment, like thumds, involves an injury to self-regard that is blamed on another and that gives rise to a moralized frame of one's situation. Ressentiment, however, frames libidinal rage as a neurotic response that is unjustified. As Scheler puts it:
Ressentiment is an incurable, persistent feeling of hating and despising which occurs in certain individuals and groups. It takes its root in equally incurable impotencies or weaknesses that those subjects constantly suffer from. The feeling of resentiment leads to false moral judgments made on other people who are devoid of this feeling. Such judgments are not infrequently accompanied by rash, at times fanatical claims of truth generated by the impotency this feeling comes from.
Scheler, Ressentiment S. Richard Weisberg suggests much the same: "In its frequent appearance among literary characters, ressentiment reveals its literal meaning, 'resensing.' The ressentient man lives through, again and again, the event that proves his passivity, resenses and intellectualizes it to the point of creating a false 
